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COMMENTS
DISCIPLINING CHILDREN WITH
DISABILITIES UNDER THE INDIVIDUALS
WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT
For twenty years, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act' (the
"IDEA" or the "Act") has provided millions of previously neglected chil-
dren with disabilities access to "a free appropriate public education." 2 As
Congress commences deliberation on legislation to reauthorize the
IDEA, educators and legislators will have the opportunity to evaluate
and improve on its success.3 At the heart of the IDEA lie two broad
mandates, one substantive and the other procedural. The substantive
component of the IDEA affords students with disabilities the right to be
educated together with nondisabled students in regular classes, as op-
posed to segregated special education classes. This concept, commonly
known as "mainstreaming," 4 is articulated in section 1412(5)(B) of Title
1. Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104
Stat. 1103 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)) (amend-
ing Education For All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat.
773).
2. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (Supp. V 1993).
3. See generally Hearing on the Reauthorization of the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Select Education and Civil Rights
of the House Comm. on Education & Labor, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 103 (1994) [hereinafter
Reauthorization Hearing of July 19, 1994] (subcommittee's fifth hearing on the reauthoriza-
tion of the Individuals with Disabilities Act); Hearing on the Reauthorization of the Indi-
viduals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Select
Education and Civil Rights of the House Comm. on Education & Labor, 103d Cong., 2d
Sess. 91 (1994) [hereinafter Reauthorization Hearing of April28, 1994] (defining the essen-
tial elements that make inclusion work successfully); Hearing on the Reauthorization of the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Se-
lect Education and Civil Rights of the House Comm. on Education & Labor, 103d Cong., 2d
Sess. 74 (1994) [hereinafter Reauthorization Hearing of March 10, 1994] (first of a series of
hearings on the reauthorization of the Individuals with Disabilities Act).
4. The term "mainstreaming" denotes "the concept of serving the handicapped
within the regular school program, with support and personnel and services, rather than
placing children in self-contained special classes." Allan G. Osborne Jr., Ed. D., When Has
a School District Met Its Obligation to Mainstream Handicapped Students Under the EHA?,
58 EDUC L. REP. 445 (1990) (citing KELLY AND VERGASON, DICTIONARY OF SPECIAL
EDUCATION & REHABiLrrATnON (1978)). Mainstreaming should be distinguished from
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20 of the IDEA.' Specifically, section 1412(5)(B) mandates that states
receiving funds under the IDEA must establish:
[P]rocedures to assure that, to the maximum extent appropriate,
children with disabilities ... are educated with children who are
not disabled, and that... removal of children with disabilities
from the regular educational environment occurs only when the
nature or severity of the disability is such that education in regu-
lar classes with the use of supplementary aids and services can-
not be achieved satisfactorily.
Proponents of mainstreaming contend that integrating disabled stu-
dents with nondisabled students benefits both groups. Through integra-
tion, disabled students receive effective educational services and develop
social skills, while nondisabled students develop positive attitudes toward
their disabled peers.7 Thus, not only has the IDEA assisted disabled per-
sons to lead more productive lives, but it has also made more nondisabled
persons realize the potential for persons with disabilities to make valua-
"inclusion" which is discussed in Part Ill of this Comment. See infra notes 173-74 and
accompanying text; see also Board of Educ. v. Holland, 786 F. Supp. 874,876 n.6 (E.D. Cal.
1992), aff'd sub nom. Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398 (9th
Cir. 1994) (noting that "mainstreaming" is distinguished from "inclusion" by the fact that a
child may be "mainstreamed" in the regular classroom for parts of the day with the special
education class being the primary placement, while "inclusion means a child's primary
placement is the regular classroom").
5. This comment will cite to the relevant sections of Title 20 rather than the corre-
sponding sections of the IDEA. The Supreme Court interpreted the IDEA's mainstream-
ing requirement for the first time in Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
Under Rowley. a local education agency may provide a disabled child with a free and ap-
propriate public education if the agency (1) follows the procedural guidelines set forth in
the Act, and (2) develops an individualized educational program, according to the Act's
procedures, which are reasonably designed to provide the child with an educational bene-
fit. Id. at 206-07; see also infra note 12 (defining local education agency).
6. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). "[T]his provision sets forth a
'strong congressional preference' for integrating children with disabilities in regular class-
rooms." Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1213-14 (3d Cir. 1993) (citations omitted);
see also Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1403 (9th Cir. 1994)
(discussing the mainstreaming requirements of the IDEA); Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of
Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1045 (5th Cir. 1989) (discussing the mainstreaming requirements of
the IDEA); Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1983) (discussing the main-
streaming requirements of the IDEA). The regulations implementing section 1412(5)(B)
require that children with disabilities be educated in the "least restrictive environment."
34 C.F.R. § 300.550 (1992).
7. See Reauthorization Hearing of March 10, 1994, supra note 3, at 104-05 (statement
of Dorothy K. Lipsky, Director, National Center on Restructuring and Inclusion); Albert
Shanker, Where We Stand on the Rush to Inclusion: Disabled Students (Jan. 14, 1994), in 60
VITAL SPEECrmS oF Tm DAY 314, 316 (March 1, 1994); Gene I. Maeroff, Educating the
Handicapped: A Decade of Change, N.Y. TMmEs, Dec. 3, 1985, at B14.
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ble contributions to society.8
The second broad mandate of the IDEA, found in section 1415 of Title
20, consists of detailed procedural safeguards which ensure that students
with disabilities are educated in the mainstream environment.' A vital,
yet controversial component of the IDEA's procedural safeguards is the
"stay-put" provision. 10 The stay-put provision emphasizes. the IDEA's
mainstreaming preference:
[U]nless the State or local educational agency and the parents or
guardian otherwise agree, the child shall remain in the then cur-
rent educational placement of such child, or, if applying for ini-
tial admission to a public school, shall, with the consent of the
parents or guardian, be placed in the public school program un-
til all such proceedings have been completed."
The stay-put provision has caused serious concern among educators,
legislators, and parents about the ability of local education agencies
("LEAs")' 2 to maintain a safe, effective learning environment.13 Thus, if
a child continually engages in disruptive or dangerous conduct in the
mainstream classroom and his parents do not consent to a change in
8. Reauthorization Hearing of July 19, 1994, supra note 3, at 34 (statement of Boyd
W. Boehlje, President, National School Boards Association). But see W. N. Bender, The
Case Against Mainstreaming: Empirical Support for the Political Backlash, 105 EDUCATION
279, 284 (1985) (discussing the negative impact of mainstreaming).
9. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1988).
10. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3) (1988); see also Gail P. Sorenson, The Many Faces of the
EHA's "Stay-Put" Provision, 62 EDuC. L. REP. 833 (1990) (providing a detailed discussion
of the stay-put provision).
11. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3) (1988). "By preserving the status quo ante, the stay-put
provision ensures an uninterrupted continuity of education for a disabled child pending
administrative resolution." Light v. Parkway C-2 Sch. Dist., 41 F.3d 1223, 1227 (8th Cir.
1994) (citations omitted).
12. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(8) (1988). A local education agency is:
[a] public board of education or other public authority legally constituted within a
State for either administrative control or direction of, or to perform a service
function for, public elementary or secondary schools in a city, county, township,
school district, or other political subdivision of a State, or such combination of
school districts or counties as are recognized in a State as an administrative
agency for its public elementary or secondary schools.
Id.
13. See Reauthorization Hearing of July 19, 1994, supra note 3, at 35-39, 85-86 (state-
ments of Boyd W. Boehlje and Mary Beth Kluge, Ph.D., Director of Special Education,
Akron Public Schools); Pete Idstein, Swimming Against the Mainstream, 75 Pn DELTA
KAPPAN 336, 339-40 (1993); Maeroff, supra note 7, at B14; see also Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S.
305, 323-25 (1988) (expulsion of disabled students who engaged in dangerous behavior
held to be a violation of the IDEA); M.P. v. Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist. 858 F. Supp
1044 (S.D. Cal. 1994).
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placement, the stay-put provision mandates that the child remain in the
mainstream setting until both the parents and the LEA exhaust all ad-
ministrative remedies provided by the IDEA. 4 In essence, the courts
limit the discretion of school officials by prescribing the types of discipli-
nary procedures they may use when dealing with a disruptive student
with disabilities.15 Furthermore, when LEAs are compelled to seek judi-
cial relief, they face an onerous legal burden for removing students.16
Consider the following two scenarios. Fourteen-year-old Jerry Malone,
a student with "borderline" intelligence and a serious learning disability
which impaired his ability to comprehend and analyze written and oral
expression, was having difficulty behaving appropriately in school. 7
School officials attempted to discipline Jerry for acting as a "go-between"
for two nondisabled students who asked him to purchase "speed" for
them from another student.' 8 After a hearing, the school board decided
to expel Jerry. 9 A federal court ruled that such an expulsion violated
provisions of the IDEA because Jerry's misconduct was caused by his
disability.2" Six-year-old Jimmy Peters has been diagnosed as "communi-
catively handicapped" (i.e., able to speak in only disconnected words).2
Despite the fact that Jimmy threw chairs, toppled desks, and repeatedly
14. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(e)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1995); see, e.g., Honig, 484 U.S. at
305 (1988).
15. See Honig, 484 U.S. at 325-26, 325 n.8 (1988) (limiting the discretion of school
officials with respect to disciplining procedures to the use of study carrels, time-outs, or
restricting privileges). Section 1401(a)(1)(A)(i) defines "children with disabilities" as
children:
(i) With mental retardation, hearing impairments including deafness, speech or
language impairments, visual impairments including blindness, serious emotional
disturbance, orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health
impairments, or specific learning disabilities; and (ii) who, by reason thereof,
need special education and related services.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. V 1993).
16. Honig, 484 U.S. at 322-27. Where school officials seek injunctive relief to remove a
dangerous or disruptive disabled child pending administrative proceedings, the stay-put
provision "effectively creates a presumption in favor of the child's current educational
placement which school officials can overcome only by showing that maintaining the child
in his or her current placement is substantially likely to result in injury to either himself or
herself, or to others." Id. at 328. Given this standard, the school district in Honig agreed
that "the availability of judicial relief is more illusory than real .... Id at 326.
17. School Bd. v. Malone, 762 F.2d 1210, 1212 (4th Cir. 1985).
18. Id
19. Id.
20. Id at 1218.
21. Don J. DeBenedictis, Schools See Disabled Protection As Threat To Safety: Under
Federal "Stay-Put" Provisions, It's Hard To Remove Dangerous Students, NAT'L L.J., June
27, 1994, at A9 (discussing Ocean View Elementary School v. Peters).
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bit and kicked other students, he remained in a mainstream kindergarten
class. When school officials attempted to transfer Jimmy to a special edu-
cation class over his parents' objections, a federal court ruled that remov-
ing Jimmy from the regular classroom violated the IDEA's stay-put
provision and ordered the school to readmit Jimmy to the mainstream
classroom.22
Cases like Jerry and Jimmy illustrate the controversy surrounding the
IDEA's stay-put provision. The IDEA has created a dual disciplinary
system in public schools where nondisabled students are held fully ac-
countable for their actions, but students protected by the IDEA may util-
ize the stay-put provision to avoid full responsibility for their actions.
Critics of the IDEA's stay-put provision argue that it compromises the
learning environment in a variety of ways. In the case of a disruptive or
physically abusive student, not only must a teacher devote more attention
to that student at the expense of all other students (including other dis-
abled or disadvantaged students), but the stay-put provision jeopardizes
the safety of all students for an extended period of time. 3 In addition,
teachers, frustrated by their limited ability to control their classroom and
their inadequate training to deal with children with specialized needs, are
resigning because they can no longer control their classrooms or maintain
an effective academic environment.' Some educators fear that this situa-
tion will inevitably cause parents of nondisabled students to remove their
children from public schools.'
Most importantly, let us not forget the very students whose interests
the IDEA is designed to protect. Mainstreaming may not always be the
best placement for a student with a disability. If, as in Jerry's case, the
disabled student is exploited by other students, questions arise as to the
suitability of the mainstream environment for the education of that child.
Where the mainstream environment creates the potential for exploitation
of the disabled student, does it not follow that such an environment is
inappropriate for the disabled student?
Many educators and legislators agree that the IDEA, particularly its
stay-put provision, must be modified in order to enable local educators to
adequately attend to the educational needs of both disabled and nondis-
22. Id. This case is discussed in Part II of this Comment. See infra notes 165-69 and
accompanying text (discussing Ocean View Elementary School v. Peters).
23. See Reauthorization Hearing of July 19, 1994, supra note 3, at 36-40 (statement of
Boyd W. Boehije) (discussing safety issues under the IDEA).
24. 140 CONG. REc. S10005 (daily ed. July 28, 1994) (statement of Sen. Gorton).
25. Shanker, supra note 7, at 315.
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abled students.26 When Congress commenced hearings on the
reauthorization of the IDEA in the spring of 1994, many educators and
advocates for disabled children took this opportunity to present to Con-
gress their proposals for improving the IDEA.27 Not surprisingly, one
common suggestion was to amend the stay-put provision.28
Deliberation on legislation reauthorizing the IDEA did not resume un-
til the fall of 1995. In the interim, Congress recognized the urgent need
to remedy the unfavorable effects of the stay-put provision, and in Octo-
ber 1994, temporarily amended the IDEA by enacting the Improving
America's School Act of 1994 ("IASA").2 9 This statute amended the
IDEA's stay-put provision by permitting school officials to exclude stu-
dents with disabilities for up to forty-five days for bringing a firearm to
school.a The amendment will remain effective until the enactment of
legislation reauthorizing the IDEA,3 ' which will presumably include a
modified stay-put provision.
While the newly amended stay-put provision restores some authority to
school officials, it fails to address the issue of disciplining or temporarily
removing a disruptive or potentially dangerous student with disabilities
whose misconduct does not include the use of a firearm. 32 Nor does it
address the dual disciplinary system now in effect. Future legislation
reauthorizing the IDEA must address these issues.
The IDEA's stay-put provision must be amended to permit local school
officials to (1) effectively discipline all disruptive or dangerous students
with disabilities, not just those who bring a firearm to school, and (2)
place such students in responsible interim placements outside of the
mainstream classrooms, pending resolution of any disagreement between
26. See Reauthorization Hearing of April28, 1994, supra note 3, at 19-21 (statement of
Elizabeth Truly, American Federation of Teachers); Reauthorization Hearing of July 19,
1994, supra note 3, at 37-40, 85-86 (statements of Boyd W. Boehlje and Mary Beth Kluge).
27. See generally Reauthorization Hearing of July 19, 1994, supra note 3; Reauthoriza-
tion Hearing of April 28, 1994, supra note 3; Reauthorization Hearing of March 10, 1994,
supra note 3.
28. See Reauthorization Hearing of July 19, 1994, supra note 3, at 37-40, 85-86 (state-
ments of Boyd W. Boehlje and Mary Beth Kluge); Reauthorization Hearing of April 28,
1994, supra note 3, at 19-21 (statement of Elizabeth Truly, American Federation of
Teachers).
29. Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108 Stat. 3518 (to be codified in scattered sections of 20
U.S.C.). This is "[a]n Act to extend for five years the authorizations of appropriations for
the programs under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, and for certain
other purposes." Id.
30. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(a)(3)(B) (West Supp. 1995).
31. Id
32. 140 CONG. REc. H10119 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1994) (statement of Mr. Kildee).
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the school and the child's parents regarding the child's appropriate place-
ment. However, any change in the law must remain sensitive to the pur-
poses for which the IDEA was originally enacted and should retain the
strongest possible safeguards to further these goals.33 Ultimately, any
amendment to the stay-put provision must not create another loophole
by which disabled students may again be excluded from the mainstream
and be deprived of an appropriate public education.34
This Comment will discuss the need to amend the stay-put provision of
the IDEA. Following a brief description of the IDEA's statutory frame-
work, this Comment will trace the development of the case law relating to
disciplining students with disabilities. Next, this Comment will describe
the negative consequences of the limitations placed on the authority of
local school officials to discipline disabled students. This Comment con-
cludes with several proposals for refining the IDEA, including amending
the stay-put provision in order to better achieve its objectives.
I. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
A. Substantive Provisions
In 1975, Congress enacted the Education for All Handicapped Chil-
dren Act ("EAHCA")35 which requires that children with disabilities
have access to "a free appropriate public education. '36 This legislation
followed congressional findings that one million children with disabilities
were unilaterally excluded from public schools, and that more than half
of the nation's eight million disabled children were not receiving appro-
priate educational services.37 Congress was also motivated by two
landmark federal court decisions concerning the denial of an appropriate
33. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (Supp. V 1993). According to the Act:
It is the purpose of this Chapter to assure that all children with disabilities have
available to them ... a free appropriate public education which emphasizes spe-
cial education and related services designed to meet their unique needs, to assure
that the rights of children with disabilities and their parents or guardians are pro-
tected, to assist States and localities to provide for the education of all children
with disabilities, and to assess and assure the effectiveness of efforts to educate
children with disabilities.
Id.; see also infra notes 35-55 and accompanying text (discussing the goals of the IDEA).
34. See 140 CONG. REc. S10009-10 (daily ed. July 28,1994) (statement of Sen. Harkin).
35. Pub. L. No. 94-142,89 Stat. 773 (amending the Education of the Handicapped Act,
Pub. L. No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 121 (1970)). The EAHCA was renamed the IDEA in 1990.
Pub. L. 101-476, Title IX, § 901(a)(1), Oct. 30, 1990, 104 Stat. 1141, 1142.
36. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (Supp. V 1993).
37. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(b)(1)-(4) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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education to children with disabilities:3 s Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded
Children ("PARC") v. Pennsylvania39 and Mills v. Board of Education.4"
Congress cited these two cases numerous times as sources of inspiration
for the legislation.4
Mills, in particular, demonstrated to Congress that many children with
disabilities were excluded pursuant to state statutes or local policies, typi-
cally without any consultation or notice to their parents.42 In Mills,
school officials had labeled two of the seven "exceptional" plaintiffs as
"behavioral problems," and had excluded all seven of them from classes
without providing any alternative education to them or any notice or
hearing to their parents.43 After finding that this practice was common-
place, affecting between 12,000 to 18,000 students with disabilities,44 the
District Court for the District of Columbia fashioned a detailed plan
whereby students with disabilities would be assured access to a free and
appropriate public education.45
The IDEA confers upon disabled students an enforceable substantive
right to a public education in states which receive federal funding under
the Act.46 A participating state must demonstrate that it "has in effect a
38. S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1975), reprinted in 2 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425,
1430 (1975).
39. 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971). PARC involved a suit on behalf of retarded
children challenging a state statute which effectively excluded them from public education
and training. Id. at 1258. The Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania held that the denial of educational services to children with mental retardation
contravened the equal protection clause. Id. The court issued a consent decree enjoining
the state from "deny[ing] to any mentally retarded child access to a free public program of
education and training." Id.
40. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D. D.C. 1972). In Mills, the District Court for the District of
Columbia held that the exclusion of children with disabilities from public schools violated
the due process clause. Id. at 875.
41. See CONG. REc. H10119 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1994) (statement of Mr. Kildee).
42. Mills, 348 F. Supp at 868.
43. Id. at 869-70.
44. Al. at 868.
45. Id. at 878-83. It is important to note that in its detailed plan, the Mills court pre-
served the school principal's authority to maintain a safe environment. Whenever the
school board proposed to suspend, expel, transfer, or otherwise deny access to regular
instruction for more than two days, the school board must afford the student a hearing. Id
at 880. Pending the hearing and notification of the decision, no change in placement shall
occur, "unless the principal... shall warrant that the continued presence of the child in his
current program would endanger the physical well-being of himself or others." Id. at 883.
46. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 310 (1988) (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S.
176 (1982)). The IDEA conditions receipt of financial assistance on a state's compliance
with the Act's substantive and procedural provisions. Id. at 310. At present, all 50 states
and the District of Columbia receive federal funding under this statute. Id. at 310 n.1.
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policy that assures all children with disabilities the right to a free appro-
priate public education."47 The IDEA prescribes the criteria with which
this policy must comply.48 The policy must also be reflected in a formal
plan detailing the procedures under which the state will implement this
policy. 49 The formal plan must be submitted to the Secretary of Educa-
tion for approval."s
Central to the goal of providing each disabled child with an appropriate
education tailored to his or her unique needs, is the "individualized edu-
cation program" ("IEP").51 An IEP is a comprehensive document which
sets forth objectives, policies, and guidelines to govern each student's
day-to-day schooling.5' The IDEA requires that after a multidisciplinary
team has evaluated a student and determined that the student has a disa-
bility requiring special services,53 the public school agency must hold a
meeting within thirty days to develop an IEP detailing the child's present
educational performance, the annual goals and short term objectives for
improvement, and the special instruction and related services that will
enable the child to meet those objectives.54 The LEA must review and,
where appropriate, revise each child's IEP at least annually.'5
B. Procedural Safeguards
Congress recognized the importance and necessity of parental partici-
pation in both the development of the IEP and any subsequent assess-
ments of its effectiveness. Thus, the IDEA establishes various procedural
provisions that guarantee parents both the opportunity to participate in
decisions affecting their child's education, and the right to seek review of
any decisions they think inappropriate.5 6 Section 1415 of the IDEA pro-
47. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1) (Supp. V 1993).
48. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)-(7) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
49. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
50. 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a) (1988).
51. 34 C.F.R. § 300.340 (1995).
52. 34 C.F.R. § 300.341-300.350 (1995).
53. 34 C.F.R. § 300.533(e) (1995).
54. 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.343, 300.346 (1995). The meeting shall include a representative of
the school agency, the child's teacher, the child's parent, the child if appropriate, and a
member of the multidisciplinary team or some other person with knowledge of the particu-
lar evaluation procedures employed and familiar with the results. 34 C.F.R. § 300.344(a)-
(b).
55. 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(1l)-1414(a)(5) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (providing that partici-
pating states must provide procedures for evaluating the effectiveness of each child's IEP
at least annually).
56. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (Supp. V 1993); Stewart R. Hakola, Suspension, Expulsion,
and Discipline of Handicapped Students, 68 MIcH. B.J. 1088 (1989).
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vides parents or guardians of children with disabilities a right of access to
all school records pertaining to their child, a right to an independent edu-
cational evaluation, and a right to written notice prior to any changes or
refusals to change their child's identification, evaluation, or placement.
57
In addition, parents must have an opportunity to present complaints to
the LEA about their child's IEP.58 These procedural requirements allow
the parents of disabled students to actively collaborate with school au-
thorities in the development of the student's IEP.
If the parents of a student with disabilities object to any aspect of the
LEA's provision of an appropriate public education, parents are entitled
to a local or state-level "impartial due process hearing" to resolve their
complaint.5 9 If the initial hearing is conducted by the LEA, as opposed
to a state-level agency, either party may seek further state review.
60
Where a formal state appeal or an initial decision by the state-level
agency proves unsatisfactory, any aggrieved party may bring a civil action
in state or federal court. There, the judge will review the record de novo
and base his decision on the preponderance of the evidence. 6' The "stay-
put" provision governs the placement of a child pending the completion
of these often lengthy administrative and judicial review procedures. 62
II. DISCIPLINING THE HANDICAPPED STUDENT UNDER THE STAY-PUT
PROVISION
A. The Authority to Discipline Students with Disabilities
It is well established that students facing temporary suspension from a
public school possess property and liberty interests that qualify for pro-
tection under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.63
"Once it is determined that due process applies, the question remains
what process is due."'  In Goss v. Lopez, the Supreme Court articulated
the degree of procedural protection required before a student may be
excluded from school.65 The necessary protection corresponds to the
57. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(A)-(D) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
58. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(E) (1988).
59. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2) (1988).
60. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c) (1988).
61. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1988).
62. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3) (1988).
63. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573 (1975) (holding that plaintiffs had a
property and liberty interest in a public education which qualified for 15rotection under the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
64. Id. at 577 (citing Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
65. d. at 565.
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length of the exclusion.66
In Goss, nine students suspended from their respective high schools for
various incidents of alleged misconduct challenged the constitutionality
of a state statute permitting school principals to suspend students for up
to ten days without a hearing.67 The Court held that the state could not
deprive the students of the right to a public education without due pro-
cess.68 The holding in Goss requires that if a school undertakes to sus-
pend a student for ten days or less, the student is entitled to oral or
written notice of the charges against him and an opportunity to respond
before the suspension occurs.69 No formal hearing is required. The
Court, however, did provide for the immediate removal of students who
"pose [ ] a continuing danger to persons or property or an ongoing threat
of disrupting the academic process."7 In such cases, the required notice
and hearing must follow as soon as practicable.71
The Goss Court, however, did not define what procedural due process
is required for suspensions of longer than ten days, stating only that
"[ljonger suspensions or expulsions... may require more formal proce-
dures."'72 What this additional protection includes has been the subject of
much litigation involving the disciplining of students with disabilities.
While Goss articulates the procedural protection afforded nondisabled
students subject to disciplinary proceedings, section 1415 sets forth the
framework within which handicapped students in the mainstream public
school environment may be disciplined.7" Determining when and how
protection for disabled students applies depends on the particular disci-
plinary action involved. The threshold question is "when do disciplinary
exclusions of handicapped students constitute a change in educational
placement, thereby invoking the stay-put provision."'74
66. Id
67. Id. at 568.
68. Id at 573-74. According to the Court:
On the basis of state law, appellees plainly had legitimate claims of entitlement to
a public education. OHio REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3313.48 and 3313.64 (1972 and
Supp. 1973) direct local authorities to provide a free education to all residents
between five and 21 years of age, and a compulsory-attendance law requires at-
tendance for a school year of not less than 32 weeks.
Id
69. Id at 581.
70. Id at 582.
71. Id at 582-83.
72. Id at 584.
73. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
74. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(C) (1988); 34 C.F.R. § 300.504 (1994).
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"Current placement" refers to the last, uncontested educational pro-
gram or status prior to the development of a controversy between the
school and the parents.75  A "change in placement, 76 refers to any
change in a student's program, services, or education which has a signifi-
cant effect on the child's learning experience.7 7 In order to achieve a
change in placement, at a minimum, parental acquiescence is required.7'
Parental objection to a new educational program invokes the stay-put
provision, thus preventing the removal of a child with disabilities from
the mainstream setting.
In the case of short-term suspensions of ten days or less, students with
disabilities are entitled to the same procedural protections as those af-
forded nondisabled students under Goss.7 9 In other words, short-term ex-
clusions do not constitute a change in placement for the purpose of
section 1415.80 However, exclusions in excess of ten days constitute a
change in placement, invoking the stay-put provision.81
In Stuart v. Nappi,82 the District Court for the District of Connecticut
considered for the first time the legality of disciplinary procedures in the
context of the IDEA (then called the EAHCA). In Stuart, a learning
disabled student became involved in a school-wide disturbance.8 3 When
the school district undertook to expel the student, she sought injunctive
relief.8 4 Although the court was reluctant to intervene in the disciplinary
process, it determined that the expulsion violated the stay-put provi-
sion." In an effort to refrain from usurping the authority and discretion
of school officials, the court took care to note the limited nature of its
75. Sorenson, supra note 10, at 834.
76. The IDEA does not define the phrase "change in placement." Honig v. Doe, 484
U.S. 305, 325 n.8 (1988).
77. DeLeon v. Susquehanna Community Sch. Dist., 747 F.2d 149, 153 (3d Cir. 1984).
78. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.504(a) (1994) (written notice must be given before change in
placement occurs); Sorenson, supra note 10, at 834.
79. See Honig, 484 U.S. at 325, 325 n.8.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 326 n.8; see also Kaelin v. Grubbs, 682 F.2d 595, 602 (6th Cir. 1982) (holding
that expulsion is a change in placement within the meaning of the Act); S-1 v. 'Trlington,
635 F.2d 342, 348 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1030 (1981) (holding that expulsion
constitutes a change in placement).
82. 443 F. Supp. 1235 (D. Conn. 1978).
83. Id, at 1239.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1243 ("It is important that the parameters of this decision are clear. This
[clourt is cognizant of the need for school officials to be vested with ample authority and
discretion. It is, therefore, with great reluctance that the [c]ourt has intervened in the
disciplinary process . . ").
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intervention and emphasized that children with disabilities were not im-
mune from a school's disciplinary procedures.
8 6
The Stuart court based its decision on an interpretation of the federal
rfgulations promulgated pursuant to the IDEA.87 Specifically, the court
considered a comment to section 121a.513 of Title 45 of the Code of Fed-
eral Regulations ("C.F.R."), which provides: "While the placement may
not be changed, this does not preclude [a school] from using its normal
procedures for dealing with children who are endangering themselves or
others."8 The court interpreted this comment as prohibiting disciplinary
measures that have the effect of changing a child's placement, while si-
multaneously permitting schools to use normal disciplinary procedures
for dealing with "children who are endangering themselves or others."
8 9
Furthermore, the court supported its interpretation by citing to the com-
ment-to-the-comment, 90 which states: "[A] comment has been added to
make it clear that this section would not preclude a public agency from
using its regular procedures for dealing with emergencies." 91
The Stuart court concluded that, when necessary, the school could im-
mediately suspend a student for less than ten days and then take the nec-
essary steps to remove the student from the mainstream placement for a
longer period, as provided by the procedural safeguards of section 1415.92
Thus, in the court's view, the school could deal with disruptive behavior
within the IDEA's procedural mandates. By recognizing the responsibil-
ity and authority of school officials to maintain order, the Stuart court
established that school officials had the authority to discipline students
with disabilities under the protection of the IDEA.
In Doe v. Koger 3 the District Court for the Northern District of Indi-
ana recognized the authority of school officials to discipline students with
disabilities. Koger involved the indefinite suspension of a mildly mentally
disabled youth who claimed his suspension was a violation of the IDEA
86. Id.
87. Id at 1242.
88. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.513 (1977).
89. Stuart v. Nappi, 443 F. Supp. 1235, 1242 (citing 42 Fed. Reg. 42,473,42,496 (1977)).
90. Id at 1242.
91. Id. at 1242 n.5; 42 Fed. Reg. 42,473, 42,512 (1977).
92. Stuart, 443 F. Supp. at 1243. The court suggested that school authorities could take
immediate disciplinary action against a disruptive handicapped student, such as suspension.
In addition, the members of the child's Planning and Placement Team could seek the long-
term remedy of requesting a change in placement of a handicapped student "who. .. [has]
demonstrated that... [his] present placement is inappropriate by disrupting the education
of other children." Id
93. 480 F. Supp. 225, 230 (N.D. Ind. 1979).
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and the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. 94  First, the
court held that school authorities could not expel the handicapped stu-
dent without first determining whether his propensity to disrupt was the
result of his handicap.95 If so, the LEA was required to place the student
in a more suitable, restricted school environment.96 On the other hand, if
the reason for the student's misconduct was not his disability, then he
could be expelled.
97
The Koger court reasoned that while section 1415 and its accompanying
regulations did not provide for the expulsion of handicapped children, it
did not prohibit such disciplinary action either.9 Rather, the IDEA only
prohibited expulsion of children whose disability caused the disruptive
conduct.99 The court reasoned that "[f]or an appropriately placed handi-
capped child, expulsion is just as available as for any other child....
[T]he distinction is that, unlike any other disruptive child, before [expul-
sion], it must be determined whether the handicap is the cause of the
child's propensity to disrupt."' 00 Therefore, the validity of any discipli-
nary action resulting in an exclusion equivalent to a change in placement
depends upon whether the child's misconduct is caused by his disability.
Next, the Koger court rejected the handicapped student's Fourteenth
Amendment claim.1 1 The court concluded that "[tio subject the handi-
capped to the same disciplinary expulsions as other students is not to in-
vidiously discriminate against the handicapped."' 1 2 In addition, the
Koger court described a school's reservation of the right to expel any stu-
dent who interfered with the education of other students as a rational
disciplinary policy.' In the court's view, the rationality of such a policy
outweighed any potential invidious discrimination.'
0 4
The first appellate court case involving exclusion of disabled students
94. IM at 226.




99. Id. "While 20 U.S.C. § 1412 and its accompanying regulations require schools to
guarantee that handicapped students have the right to be educated, they do not require
schools to guarantee that handicapped students be educated." Id
100. Id
101. Id at 229-30.
102. Id at 230. The court did not reach the issue as to whether students with disabilities
constitute a suspect class. Id.
103. Id
104. Id
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was S-I v. Turlington."'5 In this case, seven mentally retarded students
were expelled for various acts of misconduct ranging from sexual acts
against fellow students to insubordination, vandalism, and the use of pro-
fanity."' Like the district court in Koger, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit in Turlington noted that a handicapped child
could not be expelled if his handicap was the cause of his disruptive be-
havior."0 7 However, this determination on causation could be made only
by a qualified group of individuals with specialized knowledge of disabled
children.'0
8
Therefore, under Turlington, expulsion constitutes a proper disciplinary
tool only if there is compliance with the change in placement procedures
of the IDEA.10 9 Citing the C.F.R. comment relied upon in Stuart, the
Turlington court noted that a school has limited authority to remove a
handicapped child who is a danger to himself or to others." 0 The court
believed this was an appropriate interpretation of the comment because
"nothing in the statute, the regulations, or the legislative history suggests
that Congress intended to remove from local school boards... their long
recognized authority and responsibility to ensure a safe school
environment.""'
Stuart and its progeny" 2 make it clear that students with disabilities
who are a considerable risk to themselves or to others are not immune
from disciplinary action. However, such disciplinary action may contra-
vene the purposes of the IDEA by effectively depriving children with dis-
abilities of a public education. Thus, LEAs are obligated to provide
educational services during the expulsion period. 13
105. 635 F.2d 342 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1030 (1981).
106. Turlington, 635 F.2d at 344, 344 n.1. This case concerned whether nine handi-
capped students were denied their rights under the Act. At all material times, however,
two of the students were not under expulsion orders. Id. at 344.
107. Id. at 346.
108. Id. at 350; c.f. School Bd. v. Malone, 762 F.2d 1210 (4th Cir. 1985) (upholding
district court's reversal of a determination by committee of special education professionals
that a disabled student's sale of illegal drugs was not related to his disability).
109. Turlington, 635 F.2d at 350.
110. Id at 348, 348 n.9.
111. Id at 348 n.9.
112. Stuart v. Nappi, 443 F. Supp. 1235 (D. Conn. 1978); see also Victoria L. v. Dist.
Sch. Bd., 741 F.2d 369 (11th Cir. 1984) (stating that the Act was not intended to deprive
school boards of their authority and responsibility to ensure a safe school environment);
Kaelin v. Grubbs, 682 F.2d 595 (6th Cir. 1982) (stating that as long as the procedural pro-
tections of the Act are followed, children with disabilities may be expelled in appropriate
circumstances).
113. Turlington, 635 F.2d at 350.
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The preceding case law seemingly defers to the discretion of LEAs to
discipline disruptive disabled students who significantly hinder the educa-
tion of other students. The United States Supreme Court, however, in
Honig v. Doe,114 essentially stripped school officials of their discretionary
authority to discipline students with disabilities. In Honig, the San Fran-
cisco Unified School District ("SFUSD") sought to expel indefinitely two
emotionally disturbed students for violent and disruptive conduct related
to their disabilities.115 The Court held that the school board's disciplinary
actions against the disruptive students violated the IDEA." 6
In Honig, Respondent John Doe was a student at Louise Lombard
School, a development center for disabled children. 17 Doe admitted to
choking a fellow student and kicking out a school window while being
escorted to the principal's office." 8 After suspending Doe for five days,
Doe's principal recommended to the SFUSD Student Placement Com-
mittee ("SPC") that Doe be expelled.' 19 On the final day of the suspen-
sion, the SPC, pursuant to California law at the time, extended Doe's
suspension pending the completion of the expulsion proceedings. 20 Fur-
thermore, the SPC notified Doe's mother of its proposal to permanently
expel Doe 2 ' and advised Doe's mother of her right to attend the hearing
on the proposed expulsion.'1 Doe immediately sought a "temporary re-
straining order canceling SPC's hearing and requiring the school to con-
vene an IEP meeting."'' 2
The other respondent in Honig, Jack Smith, was an emotionally dis-
turbed student who had difficulty controlling his verbal and physical out-
bursts."  Based on the SPC's evaluation, the SFUSD initially placed
Smith "in a learning center for emotionally disturbed children."'" How-
ever, Smith's grandparents believed their grandson's "needs would be
114. 484 U.S. 305 (1988).
115. Id at 312.
116. Id at 328.
117. Id
118. Id at 313.
119. Id California law at the time granted school principals the authority to suspend
students for up to five consecutive school days, but permitted school districts seeking to
expel a student to extend the suspension pending resolution of expulsion proceedings. Id.
at 313 n.2 (citing CAL. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 48903(a), (h) (West 1978)).
120. Id.
121. Honig, 484 U.S. at 313.
122. Id
123. Id at 314.
124. Id.
125. Id
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better served in the public school" environment."26 Thus, the SFUSD
enrolled Smith in a public school, the A.P. Giannini Middle School, in
September 1979.127
Within a year at Giannini Middle School, Smith began to engage in
disruptive conduct." 8 Smith's misconduct included stealing, extorting
money from fellow students, and making sexual comments to female
classmates.129 In November 1980, school officials suspended Smith for
five days and recommended his exclusion from the SFUSD to the SPC.130
Thereafter, the SPC extended Smith's suspension indefinitely pending ex-
pulsion proceedings.13' After learning of Doe's action, Smith obtained
leave to intervene in the suit.
132
The SFUSD posited that case law' 33 implied a "dangerousness excep-
tion" to the stay-put provision, authorizing a school's expulsion of dan-
gerous students.134 The Court rejected this assertion, finding the
language of the stay-put provision "unequivocal" and without excep-
tions.135 The Court reasoned that the stay-put provision was "very much
meant to strip schools of the unilateral authority they had traditionally
employed to exclude disabled students, particularly emotionally dis-
turbed students, from school."'
1 36
Therefore, except for such limited disciplinary procedures as study car-
rels, time-outs, detentions, or the restriction of privileges, dangerous or
disruptive disabled students must "stay-put," unless the LEA and the par-
ents otherwise agree.137 If an agreement between the LEA and the par-
ents proves unattainable, the LEA can seek judicial relief. However, this
option does not attach until the LEA first exhausts the admittedly "pon-
126. Id
127. Id





133. See Jackson v. Franklin County Sch. Bd., 765 F.2d 535, 538 (5th Cir. 1985); Victoria
L. v. Dist. Sch. Bd., 741 F.2d 369, 374 (11th Cir. 1984); S-1 v. "Irlington, 635 F.2d 342, 348
n.9 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1030 (1981).
134. Honig, 484 U.S. at 317.
135. Id. at 323.
136. Id
137. Id at 325-26. Although the Court did not provide a basis for the validity of these
types of disciplinary actions, presumably, the Court considered these examples as not car-
rying "the potential for total exclusion that Congress found so objectionable." Id at 326
n.8.
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derous" process and obtains an injunction 3 ' of administrative reme-
dies.'39 Nevertheless, the LEA can bypass the administrative process by
overcoming the presumption in favor of the child's current educational
placement. This presumption can be defeated by demonstrating that
maintaining the child in his or her current placement is substantially
likely to result in injury to either that child or to others. 40 In sum, the
Honig court interpreted the stay-put provision as effectively creating an
"automatic injunction" in favor of the child which, without parental con-
sent, can be overcome only by judicial decree.' 4 1
The Honig decision has had a negative impact on the public education
system in several important respects. First, if the student's misconduct
stems from his disability and he continually exhibits disruptive behavior
or is exploited by other students (as in Jerry's case14 2), a school may not
transfer him to an interim placement pending the formulation of a more
effective IEP.143 Second, by failing to address whether an LEA can sus-
pend a student when there is no causal connection between his miscon-
duct and his disability, the Court inadvertently created a loophole
whereby a student facing expulsion can claim a disability to bring himself
under the protection of the IDEA and avoid immediate disciplinary ac-
tion.4 Thus, the Court has created a dual system of disciplinary proce-
dures, whereby disabled students are not subject to the same
consequences for their misconduct as nondisabled students.
B. The Superior Rights of Students with Disabilities
Since Honig, there have been several other cases illustrating the inabil-
ity of LEAs to responsibly address the inappropriate placements of dis-
ruptive students in a timely manner. In Hacienda La Puente School
District v. Honig,45 a seventh-grade boy with academic and emotional
problems was expelled for frightening another student with a starter pis-
tol.' 46 The child's parents contested the expulsion and requested an ad-
138. Id. at 328. But see id. at 326 (arguing that "the availability of judicial relief is more
illusory than real . . ").
139. Id at 322, 326.
140. Id. at 328.
141. Id. at 326.
142. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
143. See Honig, 484 U.S. at 328.
144. Reauthorization Hearing of July 19, 1994, supra note 3, at 37 (statement of Boyd
W. Boehlje).
145. 976 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1992).
146. Id. at 489.
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ministrative hearing.' 47A California Special Education Hearing Officer
concluded that the student was afflicted with a serious emotional problem
and that the actions for which he was expelled were manifestations of this
disability.' 4 s Accordingly, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that the LEA wrongly denied him the protection af-
forded by the IDEA and ordered the reinstatement of the child.14 9 In
doing so, the court expressly rejected the contention that the protection
of the IDEA applied solely to children who had been determined to have
a disability prior to their misconduct.150
While the outcome in Hacienda is consistent with the goals of the
IDEA,' it inadvertently creates a loophole whereby the Act can be
manipulated by students to undermine a school's ability to discipline
them. In M.P. v. Governing Board of Grossmont Union High School Dis-
trict,15 2 for example, a high school student in California was suspended
pending expulsion hearings for bringing a gun onto school grounds. The
student filed for a temporary restraining order against the LEA in the
District Court for the Southern District of California, and the LEA filed a
counter-claim seeking an injunction to block the student's return to
school "because he pose[d] a danger both to himself and to others."'
153
Prior to the incident precipitating the disciplinary actions, there was no
indication that the student was disabled in any manner that would require
special education.154 In addition, his family had never requested any
evaluation to determine the possible need for special education.'5s
Rather, only after the suspension meeting did the student's attorney
claim that the student suffered from Attention Deficit Disorder ("ADD")
without hyperactivity, 5 6 which under the IDEA required the school to
allow the student to return to school. The court noted that, although
there was a possibility that the student was wrongfully manipulating the
law in order to gain the protection of the IDEA, the Act did not provide




149. Id at 490, 492.
150. Id at 494.
151. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (Supp. V 1993); Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 323 (1988).
152. 858 F. Supp. 1044 (S.D. Cal. 1994).
153. Id at 1046.
154. Id at 1045.
155. Id
156. Id at 1049. The school psychologist, however, disputed this diagnosis. Id.
157. Id at 1047.
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As a preliminary matter, the Grossmont court noted that Hacienda
mandates the application of the IDEA's procedural safeguards, regard-
less of whether a child has been previously diagnosed as having a disabil-
ity."s8 Therefore, the defendants faced the burden of demonstrating that
returning the student to school was "substantially likely to result in injury
either to himself... or to others." 15 9 To determine whether the LEA had
satisfied its burden, the district court examined the potential for danger-
ous behavior inherent in ADD and the history of the student's misbehav-
ior at school.160 Given the definition of the disorder, 16 it did not appear
that harmful behavior was necessarily a symptom of the disorder. 62 In
addition, the student no longer had access to the firearm at issue, thereby
eliminating the possibility of repeating his previously inappropriate be-
havior. 63 Although the record indicated that the plaintiff had been a
disciplinary problem in the past, given the facts presented, the district
court determined that the LEA had not satisfied its burden of proving a
substantial likelihood that danger to the plaintiff or to other students
would result if the plaintiff were returned to school.' 6"
Hacienda and Grossmont demonstrate the dilemma presented by the
stay-put provision. On the one hand, the stay-put provision protects stu-
dents with disabilities from being wrongfully excluded from a mainstream
setting. On the other hand, the provision can undercut school officials'
disciplinary authority and their ability to maintain a safe, orderly learning
environment.
Another recent California case illustrates the harmful ramifications of
Honig's injunction principle. Ocean View Elementary School v. Peters165
concerned a six-year-old boy with developmental and communicative dis-
abilities placed in a regular kindergarten class. 166 The school district
158. 1d
159. Id at 1049 (quoting Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 328 (1988)).
160. Id.
161. "[T]his disorder is referred to as 'undifferentiated attention-deficit disorder,' and
the predominant feature is the persistence of developmentally inappropriate and marked
inattention." Id (citing DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENrAL DISORDERS
95 (3d ed. rev. (1987)).
162. Id The sole issue before the court was whether the LEA had satisfied its burden
to overcome the stay-put provision, thus the court had to assume the plaintiff was entitled
to the procedural protections of the IDEA. Id. at 1049 n.8.
163. Id at 1050.
164. Id at 1050-51.
165. DeBenedictis, supra note 21, at A9 (discussing Ocean View Elementary School v.
Peters).
166. Id
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charged that the boy had become disruptive: hitting and biting students,
kicking staff members, throwing loud temper tantrums, and eventually
putting his teacher on a stress-related leave.167 The school district asked
to have the student removed to a special education setting. 168 A state
superior court granted the request, but a federal district court ruled
against the school two weeks later based on the stay-put provision.
169
Ocean View and Grossmont, read in conjunction with Hacienda,
demonstrate that the stay-put provision compels the California federal
district courts to grant injunctive relief, while preventing the judge from
reviewing whether such relief is appropriate. 170 These decisions, in effect,
undermine the school's disciplinary authority. At the same time, they
provide an avenue by which a nondisabled student can circumvent state
education laws and gain the protection of a federal statute to which he or
she is not entitled.
HI. THE NEED TO AMEND THE STAY-PUT PROVISION
A. The Impact on the Learning Environment
The IDEA provides a disabled student the right to an appropriate pub-
lic education equivalent to that provided to nondisabled students. How-
ever, nothing in the IDEA requires that the rights of all students to a safe
and effective learning environment be sacrificed in the process. Never-
theless, the IDEA's procedural safeguards have evolved into a cumber-
some creature that has magnified the concept of due process to the point
that it overshadows other educational concerns.17' The ramifications ex-
tend to all aspects of the educational system. Children are sometimes
maintained in an environment which does not benefit them and which




170. M.P. v. Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist., 858 F. Supp. 1044, 1047-48 (S.D. Cal.
1994). "[A]s this present case suggests, if a child brings a gun to school, a parent or guard-
ian's response could simply be to claim that the child is disabled and therefore bypass the
laws' discipline procedures of suspension and expulsion." I. at 1048.
171. See generally Idstein, supra note 13 (discussing the time-consuming and often frus-
trating due process procedures necessary to remove a disabled child from a mainstream
classroom under the IDEA).
172. See Reauthorization Hearing of July 19, 1994, supra note 3, at 35-37 (statement of
Boyd W. Boehlje); Idstein, supra note 13, at 340; John Leo, Mainstreaming's "Jimmy Prob-
lem", U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 27, 1994, at 22. See generally Bender, supra note 8
(providing a study on the negative effects of mainstreaming on nondisabled students).
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dition, teachers become extremely frustrated with the inability of schools
to effectively discipline disruptive students, while parents of nondisabled
students question the ability of the public school system to provide their
children with a quality education. These factors signal the need for a
change in the law.
In addition to these negative consequences, the rush toward "full inclu-
sion" further supports the need for reassessment of the stay-put provi-
sion. The concept of full inclusion goes far beyond mainstreaming. In
mainstreaming, as interpreted by the federal courts, the degree to which
students with disabilities are integrated into the regular classroom varies
according to the severity of a child's disability and the difficulty of provid-
ing him or her with specialized services necessary for an appropriate edu-
cation.173 A student's IEP could, for example, include special education
classes for part of the day and regular classes for the remainder of the
day. Full inclusion, on the other hand, calls for the placement of all stu-
dents with disabilities into general education classrooms, irrespective of
the particular disability and, at times, irrespective of the student's needs
or the impact on the learning environment.
174
Keeping students who cannot control their disruptive behavior in regu-
lar classrooms is unfair to them. It is also unfair to the rest of the children
in the classroom who are deprived of the opportunity to learn and the
right to a "chaos-free" classroom. The current application of the stay-put
provision does a disservice to both disabled and nondisabled children. It
not only threatens the future success of the IDEA, but also the ability of
public schools to provide a free and appropriate education to all students.
In order to meet the challenge ahead, Congress must amend the stay-put
provision and restore the balance between the interests of disabled and
nondisabled students.
B. Restoring the Balance
Students are suspended and expelled from school for the safety of
other students. The Court in Goss noted that, "[s]uspension is considered
173. Mei-lan E. Wong, The Implications of School Choice for Children with Disabilities,
103 YALE L. . 827, 843-44 (1993); see also Abigail L. Flitter, Civil Rights-A Progressive
Construction of the Least Restrictive Environment Requirement of the Individuals with Dis-
abilities Education Act-Oberti ex reL Oberti v. Board of Education, 67 TEMPLE L.Q. 371
(1994) (discussing the different tests that have been developed by the United States circuit
courts to determine whether a LEA's placement of a disabled student complies with the
IDEA mainstreaming requirement).
174. Shanker, supra note 7, at 314.
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not only to be a necessary tool to maintain order, but also a valuable
educational device." 175 Further, "[s]tudents whose presence poses a con-
tinuing danger to persons or property or an ongoing threat of disrupting
the academic process may be immediately removed from school. 11 76 The
stay-put provision deprives school officials of this tool, rendering their
degree of disciplinary authority negligible.' 77
School officials need greater flexibility in cases where there is a rela-
tionship between the disability and the student's misconduct.171 The au-
thority of school officials to discipline students with disabilities must be
restored, while ensuring that such disciplinary actions do not serve as a
means of depriving these students a free and appropriate education.
Congress must also address the manipulation of the IDEA by students
(1) who do not have any history of requesting special education services,
(2) who do not have any credible basis for claiming a disability, and (3)
whose disability is not related to the misconduct. 79
The recent controversy surrounding the IDEA's stay-put provision has
prompted Congress to enact the Improving America's Schools Act of
1994 ("IASA"). s0 Section 314 of the IASA amends the stay-put provi-
sion of the IDEA by providing that if a child brings a weapon to school, a
school may place that child in an interim alternative educational setting
for up to forty-five days."' The term "weapon" is defined as a firearm.'8 2
If, on the other hand, the child's parents request a due process hearing to
dispute the interim placement, the child shall remain in the alternative
educational placement during the pendency of any proceedings con-
ducted pursuant to the IDEA's procedural mandates.8 3 If the child's be-
havior is determined to be unrelated to his disability, the child must be
suspended.' 84
175. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975).
176. AL at 582.
177. 140 CoNo. REC. S10005 (daily ed. July 28, 1994) (statement of Sen. Gorton).
178. Reauthorization Hearing of July 19, 1994, supra note 3, at 38 (statement of Boyd
W. Boehije).
179. Md
180. Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108 Stat. 3518 (to be codified in scattered sections of 20
U.S.C.).
181. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(e)(3)(B)(i) (West Supp. 1995).
182. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(e)(3)(B)(iv) (West Supp. 1995). "[T]he term 'weapon' means a
firearm as such term is defined in section 921 of Title 18, United States Code." Id.
183. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(e)(3)(B)(iii) (West Supp. 1995).
184. Section 101 of the IASA, which amends section 14601 of the Elementary and Sec-
ondary Education Act of 1965, to be codified at 20 U.S.C. § 8921. This section provides
that:
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During congressional debates on the IASA, Senator Gorton of Wash-
ington introduced an amendment that would have also provided for the
exclusion of students engaging in "life-threatening" behavior. 5 Con-
gress, however, chose a more narrowly defined amendment encompass-
ing only students who bring weapons to school. Some legislators feared
that the broader Gorton amendment could lead to manipulation by
schools to exclude children with disabilities.'
8 6
Section 314 of the IASA is certainly a step in the right direction. How-
ever, it only addresses one issue: disciplining a disabled student who
brings a firearm to school. What about the perpetually disruptive student
or the student who claims to have a disability after being disciplined for
misconduct? Congress must amend the stay-put provision to address
these issues.
The Clinton Administration's proposal to reauthorize and improve the
Individuals with Disabilities Act currently before Congress addresses
some of these issues. A bill embodying the proposal was introduced in
the Senate by Senator Harkin on July 26, 1995,117 and introduced in the
House of Representatives by Congressman Kildee on June 30, 1995.11
The bill proposes to provide hearing officers, as well as courts, the au-
thority to order the placement of a disabled student in an interim alterna-
tive setting for not more than forty-five days.'" 9 In order to exercise this
authority, however, the LEA must demonstrate, by substantial evidence,
that maintaining the child in his or her current placement is substantially
likely to result in injury to him or herself or to others.190 In such a case,
the state or LEA must arrange for an expedited hearing.191 The bill also
changes the term "firearm" to "dangerous weapon" as defined in section
Nothing in the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act shall supersede the
provisions of section 14601 of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act [20
U.S.C. § 8921] if a child's behavior is unrelated to such child's disability, except
that this section shall be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with the De-
partment [of Education's] final guidance concerning State and local responsibili-
ties under the Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994.
Improving America's Schools Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, § 314, 108 Stat. 3937 (1994)
(codified as amended 20 U.S.C. § 8921 note).
185. 140 CONG. Rnc. S10004 (daily ed. July 28, 1994) (statement of Sen. Gorton).
186. Id. at S10009 (statement of Sen. Harkin).
187. S.1075, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
188. H.R. 1986, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
189. S. 1075, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 205(h)(3)(C)(i) (1995).
190. Id
191. Id at § 205(h)(3)(C)(ii).
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930(g)(2) of Title 18 of the IDEA.192
The need to restore a greater balance to the IDEA is not limited to
amending the stay-put provision. For instance, the problem of a continu-
ally disruptive child may just as much be the result of a teacher's lack of
necessary skills to deal with such a student, as it is the result of an inap-
propriate placement. 93 Therefore, the provision offering more control to
school officials must be supplemented by other initiatives, such as condi-
tioning federal funding under the IDEA on a participating state's imple-
mentation of professional development programs designed to provide its
teachers with the necessary skills to manage an integrated classroom.
194
Under the IDEA, participating states are entitled to forty percent of
the excess cost of educating students with disabilities. 9 ' However, fed-
eral funding has never exceeded fourteen percent and is now approxi-
mately seven percent.196 With the increasing demands on school systems,
it is extremely difficult to meet the mandates of the IDEA under the cur-
rent inadequate funding structure.197
The lack of funding, in turn, contributes to the continuing shortage of
skilled teachers and related services personnel in public schools. In spite
of recent cutbacks, classes are continuing to increase in size, while
teacher's aides are being eliminated as further cost-saving measures.'
98
Further, full inclusion initiatives could potentially place millions of spe-
cial education students in regular classrooms.199 In dealing with a dis-
192. Id at § 205(h)(3)(B)(ii).
193. See Reauthorization Hearing of July 19, 1994, supra note 3, at 31,41 (statement of
Boyd W. Boehlje).
194. Reauthorization Hearing of April 28, 1994, supra note 3, at 23-25 (statement of
Elizabeth Truly); see also Reauthorization Hearing of July 19, 1994, supra note 3, at 123
(statement of Fred Orelove, Ph.D., Director, American Association of University Affili-
ated Programs for Persons with Developmental Disabilities) (discussing the need for a
strategic plan for personnel development).
195. 20 U.S.C. § 1411(a)(1)(B)(v) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
196. Reauthorization Hearing of July 19, 1994, supra note 3, at 83 (statement of Mary
Beth Kluge) (stating that funding under the IDEA has never exceeded 14%); Reauthoriza-
tion Hearing ofApril 28, 1994, supra note 3, at 15 (stating that funding under the IDEA has
never reached the mandated 40%).
197. Reauthorization Hearing of April 28, 1994, supra note 3, at 15-16 (statement of
Elizabeth Truly).
198. Shanker, supra note 7, at 316-17.
199. Id During the 1990-91 school year, more than five million children were receiving
special education services. Reauthorization Hearings of March 10, 1994, supra note 3 at 94
(statement of Dorothy K. Lipsky) (discussing the United States Department of Education,
Fifteenth Annual Report to Congress on the implementation of the Individuals with Disa-
bilities Education Act (1993)).
1995]
180 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 12:155
ruptive, disabled student, these factors will test the teacher's ability to
maintain order and provide adequate attention to all students.
The present system of personnel development falls short of providing
our schools with skilled and competent administrators, teachers, and re-
lated service personnel to meet the educational needs of all students.
20 0
Certain skills are critical to providing a free and appropriate education to
students with disabilities. They include child assessment, program plan-
ning, communication and consultation with parents, and the ability to
serve students with challenging needs in less restrictive educational set-
tings.20 One solution is to support and expand opportunities for interdis-
ciplinary training for professionals, paraprofessionals, families, and
individuals with disabilities. This will in turn result in the delivery of ap-
propriate education and related services.20 2
In short, effective implementation of the IDEA requires the commit-
ment of the federal government to adequately fund the provisions the
Act mandates. 203 A mandate of greater integration, without providing
the resources to make it work, offers a false promise of improved oppor-
tunities for students with disabilities and the real possibility of disruptions
in the learning environment for all students. One solution may be to shift
some of the resources consumed by the long and cumbersome due pro-
cess requirements, and instead provide adequate training of teachers and
related services personnel.20 4 This would ensure a more careful monitor-
ing of disabled students and would allow them to be moved into the
mainstream when appropriate.20 The provision of a quality education to
all students requires educational personnel equipped with the skills and
resources necessary to face the challenge of the diverse and increasingly
complex needs of students.
IV. CONCLUSION
The issues involved here are not simple. Many students who are main-
streamed under the IDEA are properly placed and are benefitting greatly
200. Reauthorization Hearing of July 19, 1994, supra note 3, at 123 (statement of Fred
Orelove).
201. Id. at 101 (statement of Mary A. O'Brien, Director of Support Services, Monroe
County, NY).
202. Id. at 123-25, 127 (statement of Fred Orelove) (describing a strategy for imple-
menting a personnel development program).
203. 1d at 44 (statement of Boyd W. Boehije).
204. Reauthorization Hearing of July 19, 1994, supra note 3, at 28 (statement of Pam
Gillet, President, The Council for Exceptional Children); Idstein, supra note 13, at 340.
205. Idstein, supra note 13, at 340.
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from that placement.2"6 Nevertheless, all students deserve the benefit of
a safe, "chaos-free"20 7 learning environment.
Granted, students with disabilities are not the only students who are
disruptive in schools. In fact, students with disabilities are more likely to
be the victims of violence and disruption than its perpetrators.208 In addi-
tion, there are cases in which a teacher simply lacks the skills necessary to
handle an individual child or group of children with special needs. In
such cases, students with disabilities may mistakenly be placed in more
restrictive environments when a different teacher or a different setting in
the mainstream would best meet their needs.209 The need to protect
these children from a segregated educational environment continues to
exist today.
The IDEA can work effectively for many students with disabilities,
while enriching the classroom experience for all students. However, par-
ents of nondisabled students must be assured that the government is at
least equally concerned about the education of their children as it is
about the education of children with disabilities.21 0 If Congress does not
take action to restore the balance between educating disabled and
nondisabled students, legislators will risk the creation of a dangerous
backlash against the IDEA that could threaten important protection for
students with disabilities.211 Congress must act to insure the safety and
education of all students.
Omyra M. Ramsingh
206. Id. at 337.
207. Leo, supra note 172, at 22.
208. Reauthorization Hearing of April 28, 1994, supra note 3, at 20 (statement of Eliza-
beth Truly).
209. Idstein, supra note 13, at 340.
210. Id.
211. Reauthorization Hearing of July 19, 1994, supra note 3, at 44 (statement of Boyd
W. Boehije).
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